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DEGREES

- Ph.D., UCLA, Economics, June 2007 (expected)
- M.A., UCLA, Economics, June 2004
- C. Phil., UCLA, Economics, September 2003
- M.A., Peking (Beijing) University, China, Economics, June 1999
- B.E., Tsinghua University, China, Mechanical Engineering, June 1995

DISSERTATION

- Title: Robust Herding with Endogenous Ordering
- Chairperson: David K. Levine
- Completion date: June 2007 (expected)

FIELDS (For Research and Teaching)

- Primary: Economic Theory
- Secondary: Political Economy, Experimental Economics

JOB MARKET PAPER

“Robust Herding with Endogenous Ordering and One-Sided Commitment”

Abstract: When making sequential decisions under imperfect information, one may learn from other people’s choices. Herding occurs when people ignore their own information and follow their predecessors. Consequently, their decisions are uninformative to others, which prevents information aggregation. Therefore, initial realization of signals can have long-term consequences and herd behavior is often error prone. We analyze an endogenous ordering sequential decision model with one-sided commitment in which decision makers are allowed to choose the time of acting or waiting. We characterize herd behavior under endogenous ordering and compare it with herd behavior

under exogenous ordering, in which only one decision maker moves at each period in an exogenously given order. We then show that with endogenous ordering, if decision makers are patient enough, at any fixed time, nearly all decision makers wait due to the negligible information disclosed. In this case, if decision makers can be forced to move with an exogenous order, the resulting equilibrium is more efficient because exogenous ordering tends to aggregate more information.

RESEARCH PAPERS

“Robust Herding with Endogenous Ordering and One-Sided Commitment”, latest version October 2006

“Robust Herding with Endogenous Ordering and Two-Sided Commitment”, latest version October 2006

“Group Reputation - A Model of Corruption”, latest version April 2005

“An Experimental Study of Herding with Endogenous Ordering”, in progress (Joint with David K. Levine)

AWARDS

Department Fellowship, Dept. of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis 2006 -2007

Department Fellowship, Dept. of Economics, UCLA 2002 -2006

Honors Pass of Quantitative Methods Comprehensive Exam, UCLA, 2002

Honors Pass of Microeconomics Comprehensive Exam, UCLA, 2002

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

Research Assistant to Prof. David K. Levine, Washington University in St. Louis, 2006 -present

Research Assistant, Economic Theory Center, UCLA, 2004 -2006

Research Assistant to Prof. Leeat Yariv, UCLA, 2004 -2005

Teaching Fellow, Undergraduate Microeconomics, UCLA, 2003 -2006

Teaching Assistant, 1st year Graduate Econometrics, UCLA, Fall 2002

MEMBERSHIP

American Economic Association

CONFERENCES & WORKSHOPS

American Economic Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, January 2007
(Scheduled)

Workshop in Economic Theory, Washington University in St. Louis, November 2006

Midwest Economic Theory Conference, Lawrence, Kansas, October 2005

Workshop in Economic Theory, UCLA, October 2005

REFERENCES

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